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A COMPARISON OF A MENTALLY ILL
INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES
AND THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONS
William M. Brooks*

INTRODUCTION

The right of a mentally ill and involuntarily hospitalized individual to refuse medication prescribed by a psychiatrist has divided the legal and psychiatric professions more than any other
recent issue. 1 Whether an individual can refuse medication has
* B.A. Ohio Weslyan University 1976; J.D., State University of New York
at Buffalo: Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence 1979; Assistant Professor, Touro
College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Supervising Attorney, Mental
Disability Law Clinic of Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
The author was formerly employed as an attorney for the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service, Second Judicial Department, during which time he litigated
Rivers v. Katz.
1. See Hickman, Resnick & Olson, Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication: An Interdisciplinary Proposal, 6 MENTAL DIsABILrrY L. REP.
122, 122 (1982) [hereinafter Hickman] (discussing a proposal which aims to
protect the individual's right to make informed choices regarding psychotropic
treatment, to insure treatment is given in a timely fashion if consented to, and
to protect patients from abuses that may occur due to misuse of treatment by
poorly trained physicians).
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understandably generated heated discussion. The legislature
grants authority to the medical profession to deprive a mentally
ill individual of liberty for the purpose of providing needed
treatment. 2 Under such circumstances, many medical professionals have questioned, and indeed assailed, the propriety of permitting a patient, who theoretically fails to understand the need for
treatment, to refuse the very medication a psychiatrist has pre3
scribed to treat the mental illness from which the patient suffers.
Invariably, the criticism accuses the legal system of failing to
take into account "clinical realities" when broadly defining the
boundaries of a patient's right to refuse. 4 On the other hand,
courts and both legal and medical commentators have recognized
the devastating side effects that antipsychotic medication produces.

5

2. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.01-.45 (McKinney 1988). Mental
Hygiene Law (MHL) section 9.27 authorizes the involuntary hospitalization of
a mentally ill individual when such person suffers from a mental illness for
which care and treatment in a hospital is essential to the individual's welfare
and his judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for
such in-patient care and treatment, Id. §§ 9.01, .27. The MHL authorizes the
involuntary hospitalization on an emergency basis of individuals deemed
mentally ill and dangerous. Id. §§ 9.37-.45. However, such confinement may
not last longer than fifteen days, and if a psychiatric facility wishes to further
confine an individual, two physicians must certify that a patient satisfies the
criteria of MHL section 9.27. Id. §§ 9.27, .39(b).
3. See, e.g., Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment With
Antipsychotic Medications:Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
413, 417 (1988) [hereinafter Appelbaum]; Schwartz, Vingiano & Bezirganian,
Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients' Attitudes After
Involuntary Medication, 39 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1049, 1049
(1988) [hereinafter Schwartz & Vingiano].

4. See Appelbaum & Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric
Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 345 (1980) [hereinafter Drug
Refusal]; Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On":
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric
Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 315 (1979) [hereinafter
Appelbaum & Gutheil]; Schwartz & Vingiano, supra note 3, at 1049.
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 928-29 (N.D. Ohio
1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (D.N.J. 1978); People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Brooks, The
ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. AcAD.
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Courts have disagreed as to the characterization of the issues
involved. Some have concluded that whether physicians should
permit a patient to refuse medication constitutes a medical determination. 6 Others have recognized that a determination of
whether a patient has the capacity to refuse medication is a legal
question. 7 Indeed, the vehemence in which both pro and anti-re-

fusal sides disagree makes one wonder whether one group or the
other can be so wrong. 8 Or are both sides correct and must the
PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 183-87 (1980); Plotkin, Limiting The Therapeutic
Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 461,
475-77 (1977) [hereinafter Plotkin]. Most right to refuse medication cases have
expressly focused upon a patient's right to refuse antipsychotic medication.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1980). However,
limiting an individual's right to refuse medication to antipsychotic drugs
ignores questions raised by the forcible administration, inter alia, of lithium, a
psychotropic drug, that produces many debilitating side effects in its own
right. See infra text accompanying notes 64-72; see also Hickman, supra note
1, at 124; Risch, Groom & Jonowsky, The Effects of PsychotropicDrugs on
the CardiovascularSystem, 43 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 21-22 (1982).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 307-08 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (court held that base-line decision to forcibly medicate should
be made by appropriate medical personnel of the custodial institution with
judicial review available to guard against arbitrariness), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990); see also Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 ('V.D.
Wis. 1985) (court found that a patient's "constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs must be measured by whether the decision to administer
such drugs is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards").
7. See, e.g., Riese v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Center, 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1303, 1322, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, 253 (1st Dist. 1988) (finding that an
institutionalized patient's informed consent was required before antipsychotic
drugs could be forcibly administered, the court held that the determination of a
patient's competence to refuse such medication is "uniquely a judicial, not a
medical function"); Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 390 Mass.
489, 495, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1983) (court rejected argument that doctors
should be responsible for making treatment decisions for involuntarily
committed patients, stating that "every competent adult has a right to forgo
treatment. .. however unwise his sense of values may be in the eyes of the
medical profession"); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) (competency of an involuntarily committed individual is not a medical decision and is
independent from the commitment decision).
8. A psychiatrist's decision to administer medication to a mentally ill
individual is a clinical decision, see supra note 6; infra text accompanying
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law account for the interrelationship between law and medicine?
Focusing on whether the right to refuse medication constitutes a
medical or legal question begs a more important question at hand.
The right to refuse issue boils down to one of judicial ideology or
philosophy. How much individual autonomy is a court willing to
grant to an individual whom either psychiatrists or a court has
determined suffers from mental illness, requires in-patient care
and treatment for such illness, does not understand the need for
such in-patient care and treatment, and possesses a substahtial
risk of physical harm to himself or others? 9

In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Project Release v. Prevost,10 addressed the scope of a civilly
notes 181, 199-200, but also amounts to a legal determination because it
impacts directly upon an individual's right to bodily integrity, see supra note
7; infra text accompanying notes 195-96. In other words, a physician's
decision to administer drugs constitutes a medical decision with significant
legal consequences. Accordingly, the characterization of a decision to forcibly
medicate as "medical" or "legal" may be little more than attempts to justify
the imposition of narrow or broad protection against forced drugging to a
mentally ill individual. See e.g., Charters, 863 F.2d at 306-10; see supra
notes 6-7.
9. In New York, once the state hospitalizes an individual there is no
automatic civil commitment proceeding. Rather, there is a right to a hearing
within five days of a patient's request. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27,
.31 (McKinney 1988). While MHL section 9.27 does not require a finding of
dangerousness, numerous New York appellate courts have required such a
finding before the state may utilize the statute to involuntarily hospitalize an
individual. E.g., In re Carl, 126 A.D.2d 640, 640, 511 N.Y.S.2d 144, 144
(2d Dep't 1987) (holding that "the state must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the person is mentally ill and that he poses a substantial threat of
physical harm to himself or others") (emphasis in original); In re Harry, 96
A.D.2d 201, 206, 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Dep't 1987) (stating that it
is "well established that if an individual can live safely in freedom and is not
dangerous to himself or others, due process will not tolerate his involuntary
commitment irrespective of whether treatment some may deem beneficial will
be provided"); Scopes v. Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913
(3d Dep't 1977) (holding that "substantive due process requires that the
continued confinement of an individual must be based upon a finding that the
person to be committed poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to
himself or others") (citation omitted).
10. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); see infra text accompanying notes 97-
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committed individual's right to refuse medication under the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. 1 1 The court rendered an opinion that narrowly interpreted a patient's right to
refuse medication, which resulted in the court permitting the state
to forcibly administer medication under the same circumstances
as it had prior to the lawsuit. 12 Three years later, the New York
13
Court of Appeals addressed the same issue in Rivers v. Katz.
Relying upon the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution, 14 the court issued a decision that one commentator
has described as the "broadest fight-to-refuse treatment opinion
yet decided by an appellate court." 15 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper1 6 clarified to a degree
the scope of an individual's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs
under the Federal Constitution. Although Harper involved the
right of a mentally ill prisoner to refuse medication, much of the
Court's analysis is pertinent to the issue of a civilly committed
individual's right to refuse medication. 17
This Article will compare a mentally ill individual's right to
refuse medication under the United States and New York
Constitutions. First, it will describe the nature of psychotropic
medication. It will then examine how the Second Circuit in
Project Release, the Supreme Court in Harper, and other federal
courts have addressed this issue in both the substantive and
procedural contexts. The Article will then compare the Federal
constitutional analysis with the New York State constitutional
analysis detailed in Rivers. This Article will conclude that the
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 84-101.
13. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); see infra
text accompanying notes 207-16.
14. Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78; N.Y. CONsr. art.
I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.").
15. 2 M. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 5.43, at 339 (1989)
[hereinafter PERLIN]. For a detailed discussion of Rivers, see infra text
accompanying notes 207-36.
16. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).

17. See infra text accompanying notes 207-37.
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New York Court of Appeals' approach to the right to refuse
medication is the preferable one. It provides patients greater
individual autonomy by rendering it more likely that patients
suffering from mental illness will make the same decisions that
impact upon their bodily autonomy as the law permits individuals
who do not suffer from mental illness. For the simple reason that
the law should strive to treat individuals who suffer from mental
illness, as much as possible, within practical limits, the same as
the citizenry as a whole, the New York Court of Appeals'
decision is sounder than decisions that have treated the right to
refuse medication issue as a medical question to be determined by
clinicians.
I. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION
Psychotropic drugs include any medications that affect mentation, 18 i.e., mental activity.1 9 They include antipsychotic medication, sedatives, tranquilizers, and hypnotics. 2 0 Antipsychotic
medications, also known as neuroleptics, aim to reverse the
symptoms of psychosis, 2 1 which is a mental disorder characterized by loss of contact with reality. 22 Presently, drug therapy
constitutes the primary source of treatment in state-operated
psychiatric centers. 2 3 In many hospitals, for all intents and
purposes, it amounts to the only treatment that patients receive. 2 4
18. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity,"
"Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of
Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 79 (1983) [hereinafter
Gutheil & Appelbaum].
19. See WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 423 (1986) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S].
20. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 79.
21. Id.
22. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 19, at 588.
23. Cichon, The Eighth Circuit and ProfessionalJudgment: Retrenchment
of the ConstitutionalRight to Refuse Antipsychotic Medicaiion, 22 CREIGHTON

L. REv. 889, 952 (1989); Kemna, Current Status of institutionalized Mental
Health Patients' Rights To Refuse PsychotropicDrugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107,

109 (1985) [hereinafter Kemna].
24. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications: Law and
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Today, "'[p]sychotropic medication is widely accepted within
the psychiatric community as an extraordinarily effective
treatment for both acute and chronic psychoses, particularly
schizophrenia.'" 25 It has been argued that "antipsychotic drugs
remain the primary modality in the treatment of an acute episode
or an acute exacerbation of schizophrenic illness." 26
Additionally, "[tihe available data do not support the feasibility
of substituting any psychotherapeutic strategy for drug treatment
on an indefinite basis." 27 Some professionals within the psychiatric community have concluded that "there is still no single
substitute for [antipsychotic drugs] .. for control of symptoms
and prevention of relapse in the majority of chronic schizophrenic
patients. Denying these patients the benefit of [antipsychotic
drugs]... without offering any suitable alternative may be considered a clinical error." 28
However, antipsychotic medication does not cure mental illness. 29 Rather, such medication suppresses such psychotic
symptomatology as hallucinations, delusions, and paranoid
ideation. 30 Furthermore, a physician often lacks the ability to
predict the efficacy of drug therapy since there is no accurate
method of determining how a patient will react to a particular
drug. 31
Antipsychotic medication produces a plethora of side effects
that range from unpleasant to devastating and even life threatening. Many side effects fall within the category of extrapyramidal
symptoms. 32 Extrapyramidal side effects involve an impairment
Policy, 39 RuTGms L. R~v. 339, 342 (1987) [hereinafter Brooks].
25. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1039 n.9 (quoting Brief for
American Psychiatric Ass'n as anicus curiaeat 10-11).
26. Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 133,
134 (1987).
27. Id. at 142.
28. Jeste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dyskinesia: An
Overview, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 297, 306 (1981).

29. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 101; Kemna, supra note
23, at 110.
30. See Kemna, supra note 23, at 110.

31. id. at 110-11.
32. See infra text accoMpanying notes 33-59.
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33
of the motor system which controls muscular movement.
Many patients find life with chronic extrapyramidal effects
unbearable. 34 One of the most common extrapyramidal
symptoms is akathisia. 35 Uncontrollable physical restlessness,
agitation, interminable pacing, anxiety and panic characterize this
syndrome. 36 To say the least, many patients find akathisia
discomforting. 37 Psychiatrists frequently have difficulty
diagnosing akathisia, 3 8 as distinguishing between akathisia and
39
psychotic excitement may be impossible.
Patients who receive antipsychotic medication also suffer from
akinesia. Akinesia is a behavioral state of diminished capacity
characterized by unspontaneous speech, apathy, and difficulty in
initiating activities. 40 Like akathisia, akinesia may be difficult to
diagnose as it is extremely difficult to differentiate schizophrenic
41
apathy from akinesia.
Other types of extrapyramidal symptoms are dystonic reactions,
which are manifested by muscle spasms, particularly in the eyes,
neck, face and arms. Like akathisia, dystonic reactions are temporary and disappear when the administration of medication is
terminated. 42 Antipsychotic medication also produces symptoms
known as parkinsonism, which consist of a mask-like face,
43
drooling, muscle stiffness, and rigidity.
By far the most insidious extrapyramidal symptom, and the one

33. Kemna, supra note 23, at 112.
34. Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse to Take Their
Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 70 (1974).
35. Brooks, supra note 24, at 348.
36. Id.
37. See Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism and the

Constitution, 72 GEo. L.J. 1725, 1744 (1984) [hereinafter Gelman].
38. Van Putten & Marder, Behavioral Toxicity of Antipsychotic Drugs, 48
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 13, 13 (1987) [hereinafter Van Putten & Marder];
Weiden, Clinical Nonrecognitionof Neuroleptic-InducedMovement Disorders:
A CautionaryStudy, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1148, 1151 (1987).
39. Van Putten & Marder, supra note 38, at 13.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id.
42. See Plotkin, supra note 5, at 475.
43. Id.; Kemna, supra note 23, at 112.
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that has generated the most discussion, is tardive dyskinesia.
Tardive dyskinesia, which has been described as a significant
public health hazard, 44 involves the involuntary movements of
facial, arm, leg, or truncal musculature. 45 Such movements have
been described as grotesque and humiliating; they frequently involve the sucking or smacking of the lips. 46 Although symptoms
appear while the patient is taking medication, they may not become clinically evident until the drug is either decreased or discontinued. 47 While many courts have recognized the problems of
tardive dyskinesia, 4 8 one court's focus illustrates why tardive
dyskinesia is so problematic:
In its most severe form, it may interfere with all motor activity,
making speech, swallowing and breathing extremely difficult.
Tardive dyskinesia is of special concern for several reasons.
First, its symptoms often do not appear until late in the course of
treatment and sometimes not until after the treatment is
discontinued. Second, there is no known cure for the condition.
Third, it is impossible to predict who will become a victim,
aside from the tendency of the condition to affect patients on
long-term high dosages of antipsychotic medications. Finally, the
condition is fairly widespread as studies have indicated that the
condition occurs in 10-40% of patients receiving long-term,
high-dosage treatment. 49
There is substantial disagreement over the prevalence of tardive
dyskinesia. It has been reported that 10 to 40 per cent of patients
who have been treated with antipsychotic medication suffer from
tardive dyskinesia. 5 0 Two studies cited by the district court in
44. Jeste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dyskinesia: An
Overview, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 297, 297 (1981).

45. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 109.
46. See Brooks, supra note 24, at 349.
47. See Kessler & Waletzky, Clinical Use of Antipsychotics, 138 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 202, 205 (1981).

48. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
49. People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968-69 (Colo. 1985) (citations

omitted).
50. See Brooks, supra note 24, at 350; Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note
18, at 109.
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Rogers v. Okin51 placed the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia at
50 and 56 per cent. The United States Supreme Court declared
that a "fair reading of the evidence" places the incidence of
tardive dyskinesia at 10 to 25 per cent. 52 Many authorities
believe tardive dyskinesia is irreversible. 53 However, some
psychiatrists assert that tardive dyskinesia often disappears, 54 or
at least remains stable or improves if patients receive extended
low or moderate dosages of antipsychotics. 55 Despite its
frequency, physicians often fail to detect the disorder,
particularly when its symptoms involve the extremities. 56 Over a
substantial period of time, for whatever reasons, psychiatrists
employed in state-operated psychiatric hospitals, including psychiatrists employed by the New York Office of Mental Health,
almost never diagnosed the disorder. 57 Perhaps because many
58
psychiatrists believe antipsychotic medication can do no wrong,
when confronted with patients who suffer from tardive
dyskinesia, some psychiatrists accuse patients of faking their
symptoms. 59
In addition to extrapyramidal symptoms, other side effects of
antipsychotics are well documented. Blurred vision, dry mouth,
60
and interference with sexual functioning are common.
Antipsychotic drugs also produce low blood pressure, urinary
retention, and constipation. 6 1 The medication can also result in
51. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).

52. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1041 (1990).
53. See Id.; Brooks, supra note 24, at 349; Gelman, supra note 37, at
1752.
54. Richardson & Casey, Tardive Dyskinesia Status: Stability or Change,
24 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 471, 474 (1988); Gutheil & Appelbaum,
supra note 18, at 109.

55. Casey, Neuroleptic Induced Tardive Dyskinesia and Parkinsonism:
Changes

During

Several

Years of Continuing Treatment,
251 (1986).
Weiden, supra note 38, at 1751.
Gelman, supra note 37, at 1755.
Id. at 1759.
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1745.
See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968 n.3 (Colo. 1985).

22

PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 250,

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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agranulocytosis (a hematological side effect characterized by sore
throat, fever, fatigue, lethargy, and other signs of infection) as
well as jaundice, skin discoloration, eye lesions, and on rare occasions, sudden death. 62 Accordingly, the nature of antipsychotic
medication is such that one court has found that "[e]ven acutely
disturbed patients may have good reason to refuse these
drugs." 63
Lithium is the treatment indicated for manic episodes of manicdepressive illness, 64 otherwise known as a bipolar
disorder. 65 However, lithium also produces many debilitating
side effects. Effects of lithium on the central nervous system
range from commonly observed mild side effects to lifethreatening irreversible brain damage in rare instances of severe
toxicity. 6 6 Lithium toxicity can occur with patients whose lithium
levels are well within ordinary therapeutic ranges. 67 Toxic effects
of lithium are initially manifested by gross tremors, persistent
headache, vomiting, mental confusion, and may progress to stupor, seizures, and cardiac arrhythmias. 68 Lithium may also impact on the immunological system of the body, 69 and has also
contributed to cardiac failure of patients who have a familial his70
tory of heart disease.
The administration of lithium can produce extrapyramidal
62. See Id.
63. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (D.N.J. 1979).
64. See PHYSICIAN'S DESK.REFERENCE 1923 (45th ed. 1991). A manic
episode is a distinct period of elevated, expansive mood, and associated
symptoms of, inter alia, increased activity, a flight of ideas, inflated self
esteem, decreased need for sleep, and an "excessive involvement in activities
without recognition of the high potential for painful consequences."
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 765 (H. KAPLAN & B. SADECK
(4th ed. 1985)) [hereinafter TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY].
65. TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 64, at 765.
66. Id. at 879.

67. See Reisberg & Gershon, Side Effects Associated with Lithium
Therapy, 36 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 879, 880 (1179) [hereinafter Reisberg &
Gershon].
68. See THE MERCK MANUAL 1461 (15th ed. 1987).
69. See Shukla & Borison, Lithium and Lupuslike Syndrome, 248 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 921, 921 (1982).
70. See Reisberg & Gershon, supra note 67, at 882.
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symptoms. 7 1 In fact, the combination of lithium and antipsychotic medication increases the risk of extrapyramidal symptoms
occurring. 72
I

II. THE RIGHT OF A PATIENT TO REFUSE
MEDICATION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Second CircuitAnalysis of a Patient'sSubstantive and
ProceduralRights to Refuse Medication
When determining the scope of a patient's right to refuse medication under the Federal Constitution, a court must address three
questions. 7 3 It must determine (1) whether the individual possesses a constitutionally protected interest in refusing medication;
(2) what, if any, state interests outweigh such individual interest;
and (3) what procedures, if any, a state must adhere to when de74
termining whether such state interests exist.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Project
Release v. Prevost,75 recognized the necessity of conducting this
analysis when it examined the constitutionality of the administra71. See Kane, Rifkin, Quitkin & Klein, ExtrapyramidalSide Effects with
Lithium Treatment, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 851, 852 (1978); see supra text
accompanying notes 33-59.
72. See Blair, Risk Management for Extrapyramidal Symptoms, 16 JOINT
COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF Hosps.; QUALITY REVIEW BULL. 116, 121
(1990).
73. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The United States
Supreme Court defined these issues as follows:
[The substantive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected
constitutional interest, as well as identification of the conditions under
which competing state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue
concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for
determining that the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed
in a particular instance.
Id. at 1036 (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)); infra text
accompanying notes 120-41.
74. Harper,110 S. Ct. at 1036.
75. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
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tive regulation promulgated by the New York State Office of
Mental Health then in existence. 76 The regulation, title 14, section 27.8 of the New York Code Rules and Regulations

(NYCRR), defined the circumstances in which a psychiatric
hospital could forcibly administer medication. 77
Although the regulation in question consisted of a three stage
administrative review, it contained absolutely no substantive
standards for the administrative reviewers to apply. 78 It enabled a
76. Id. at 977 (citing Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 (1982)).
77. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & Rlas. tit. 14, § 27.8, (1962).
78. The relevant portions of the regulations contain the following
language:
(e) Review of objection. Prior to initiating a treatment procedure over
the objection of a patient, such objection must be reviewed by the head
of the service. The decision of the head of the service shall be
communicated to the patient and his or her representative, if any, and to
the Mental Health Information Service, and treatment may be initiated
unless the patient or her or his representative chooses to appeal this
decision to the director. The appeal procedure shall be in accordance
with subdivision (e) of this section.
(d) Patient's right to representative. Patients have the right to request
that legal counsel or other concerned person represent them in the
formal appeal procedures authorized in this section.
(e) Appeal. (1) If the patient or a representative of the patient has
appealed to the facility director from a decision of the head of the
service with respect to an objection to treatment, the director shall
consider the appeal and make a decision. The decision of the director
shall be communicated to the patient and the patient's representative, if
any, and to the Mental Health Information Service.
(2) A patient shall also have the right to appeal to the director any
decision to which he objects relating to his care and treatment at the
facility.
(3) In cases of facilities in the Department of Mental Hygiene, the
patient may appeal from any such decision of the director to the regional
director in the department. Such request for review must be filed with
the director within five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays, after notification of the director's decision. The director of the
department facility shall forthwith transmit the request to the regional
director. When the regional director decides the issue, he shall notify
the patient, the patient's representative, and the director of the Mental
Hygiene Information Service of the decision.
Id. § 27.8, quoted in Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 490-91 n.2, 495 N.E.2d
337, 339-40 n.2, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77 n.2 (1986).
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patient who disagreed with any treatment decision to appeal to an
administrator known as the head of service. 79 If the patient disagreed with the head of service's decision, the patient could appeal to the hospital director.80 If the director upheld the treatment
decision, the patient could appeal to the regional director of the
Office of Mental Health. 81
In determining the scope of a patient's substantive right, the
Second Circuit relied upon two recent Supreme Court decisions
that addressed the scope of one's right to refuse medication, but
the Second Circuit failed to squarely resolve the issue. In Mills v.
Rogers, 82 the Supreme Court stated that "State law may
recognize liberty interests more extensive than those
independently protected by the Federal Constitution." 83
Accordingly, the Second Circuit, in Project Release, recognized
that "it is clear" that state law can create a federally protected
interest in refusing medication. 84 Having recognized that state
law can create a protected liberty interest in refusing medication,
the Second Circuit examined what it believed to be the relevant
state law. The court recognized that title 14, section 27.8 of the
NYCRR permitted a patient to refuse medication. 85 However, the
court failed to note that the regulations contained no substantive
standards for an administrative reviewer to apply. The court
further utilized section 33.01 of the New York Mental Hygiene
Law (MHL) as a guide to determine the scope of a patient's
substantive right to refuse medication: "'Each patient in a facility
and each person receiving services for mental disability shall
receive care and treatment that is suited to his needs and
skillfully, safely and humanely administered with full respectfor
his dignity andpersonal integrity.' "86
79. Id. § 27.8(c).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).

83. Id. at 300.
84. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir. 1983).

85. Id.; see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
86. Project Release, 722 F.2d at 960 (emphasis in original) (quoting N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(a) (McKinney 1988)).
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The court recognized that such a state law right did not create
an absolute right to refuse medication but had to be balanced
against "relevant state interests." 87 Although the court failed to
delineate what relevant state interests existed, it nonetheless concluded that the regulations in question satisfied due process. 88
The court's opinion remains somewhat unclear because the court
reached such a conclusion prior to its analysis of the professional
judgment standard. 89 However, one may assume that the court
merely concluded that state law either did not create a constitutionally protected interest in refusing medication or did not set
forth circumstances in which an individual could refuse drugs. 90
After analyzing relevant state law as is required by Mills,9 1 the
Second Circuit then examined the Supreme Court's disposition of
Rennie v Klein. 92 Like Mills, Rennie raised the issue of under
what circumstances a civilly committed individual could refuse
medication. 93 However, instead of focusing upon relevant state
law as it did in Mills, the Supreme Court remanded Rennie in
light of Youngberg v. Romeo. 94 In Youngberg, an action for
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
90. Assuming that title 14, section 27.8 of the NYCRR and section 33.01
of the MHL amounted to the relevant state law when determining whether state
law created a federally protected interest in refusing medication, the court
apparently reached the correct result for the wrong reasons. State law creates a
federally protected interest only when it creates a "justifiable expectation" that
the state will not forcibly administer medication except "upon the occurrence
of. . . specified events." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980). This
occurs only when state law contains language of an "unmistakenly mandatory
character" which indicates clearly that the state will not forcibly medicate a
patient absent "specified substantive predicates." Washington v. Harper, 110
S. Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72
(1983)). Neither title 14, section 27.8 of the NYCRR nor section 33.01 of the
MHL, contained any such substantive predicates and hence, no law created an
expectation that the state would not forcibly administer medication except
under certain clearly delineated circumstances.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
92. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
93. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1983).
94. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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damages, the Court addressed the scope of a profoundly retarded
95
individual's right to safety and freedom from bodily restraint.
Because of the need to avoid unnecessary restrictions placed upon
clinical staff, the Court ruled that any decision pertaining to the
safety and restraint of a mentally retarded individual is
presumptively valid. Furthermore, a court may impose liability
"only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
6
did not base the decision on such a judgment.,, 9
The Second Circuit in Project Release v. Prevost97 utilized the
professional judgment standard of Youngberg to evaluate the
"standards set forth for objecting to treatment in New York
State."' 9 8 It reasoned that because title 14, section 27.8 of the
NYCRR required three stages of administrative review, the regulation resulted in physicians exercising professional judgment. 99
The court concluded further that procedural due process does not
require a judicial review of the decision to forcibly medicate;
"informal, traditional medical investigative techniques" can satisfy due process. 100 The three levels of professional review mandated by the regulation after the initial decision by the treating
physician satisfied procedural due process. 101
Since Youngberg and Project Release, and at least prior to
Washington v. Harper,102 federal courts have measured a civilly
committed individual's right to refuse medication by the
Youngberg professional judgment standard. 10 3 Such a standard
95. Id. at 309.

96. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted).
97. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).

98. Id. at 980.
99. Id. at 980-81.
100. Id. at 981 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)).
101. Id.
102. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 120-3 1.
103. See Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300-01 (8th Cir.
1987) (section 1983 claim failed to prove that former psychiatric patient was

denied due process since professional judgment was exercised when
psychotherapeutic medication was forcibly administered); Johnson v. Silvers,

742 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984) (Plaintiff must establish that physician
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provides virtually no protection to a patient who wishes to refuse

medication. It requires a court to determine only if the clinician's
decision to medicate constituted such a substantial departure from
professional judgment as to amount to a decision not based upon
professional judgment. 104 In other words, the clinical decision
need only satisfy "professionally accepted minimum stan1 05
dards."

Because antipsychotic medication constitutes the treatment of
choice for psychoses within the psychiatric profession, 10 6 and
lithium is the drug of choice for manic and depressive disorders, 10 7 proving a decision to administer these drugs was not
based on professional minimal standards becomes a near impos-

sibility when a patient carries the relevant diagnosis.
Notwithstanding the debilitating nature of psychotropic drugs,
particularly antipsychotic medication, a psychiatrist, in the exerrequired him to take antipsychotic drugs without exercising professional
judgment); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3rd Cir. 1983) (en band)
(involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs in accordance with the professional judgment standard);
Stensvad v Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (Wisconsin's
commitment statute, which does not afford involuntarily committed psychiatric
patients the right to refuse medication, provides adequate due process
safeguards because the administration of drugs is tested by professionally
accepted standards); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1321-22 (N.D.
Tex. 1984) (although involuntarily committed patients cannot refuse treatment,
their treatment decision is reviewable in accordance with the professional
judgment standard).
104. See Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737
F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984) (residents of state-operated school for the
mentally retarded have constitutional right to adequate food, shelter, clothing,
and medical care; however, if restraints are placed on retarded individuals in
accordance with judgment of qualified professionals, then the mental health
facility has not failed to meet the constitutional due process standard).
105. Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 902 F.2d
1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1990) (lower court misused expert testimony by treating it
as evidence of alternate choices against which institution's treatment should be
compared and, therefore, failed to determine whether treatment of stateoperated facility for the mentally retarded departed from accepted professional
judgment, as to support a finding of constitutional violations).
106. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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cise of professional judgment, might well choose to ignore the
risks of antipsychotic drugs.1 08 Indeed, some commentators have
argued that "opponents of medication dramatize their side effects, including dystonias [muscle spasms] and tardive dyskinesia
[a lasting involuntary movement disorder] ...

the overwhelming

preponderance of data supports a high benefit/risk ratio for these
medications and a safety record commensurate with other powerful pharmacological agents."109 Likewise, a psychiatrist may
well conclude that proper monitoring can reduce the risk of the
more serious forms of tardive dyskinesia. 110 Considering these
circumstances, a court will nearly always conclude that a
clinician's decision to administer medication does not fall below
minimum professional standards.1 11
Indeed, upon scrutiny, the professional judgment standard affords absolutely no protection to individuals who wish to refuse
medication. The utilization of a professional judgment standard to
evaluate a decision to forcibly medicate is, at best, little more
than a malpractice standard incorporated into the Federal
Constitution. Upon scrutiny, however, this standard does not
provide patients with even a constitutional right to remain free
from treatment decisions to forcibly medicate which amount to
malpractice. A malpractice standard imposes liability upon a
physician only when a physician fails to possess the skill
possessed by the average member of his profession, does not
exercise ordinary and reasonable care in application of such skill,
108. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
109. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 4, at 307; see also Baldessarini &
Lipinski, Risks of Antipsychotic Drugs Overemphasized, 305 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 588, 588 (1981).
110. See American Psychiatric Ass'n, TASK FORCE REPORT 18: TARDIVE
DYSKiNESiA, 137-53 (1980).

111. Adoption of the professional judgment standard of Youngberg raises
another troubling issue: how can a patient establish that the decision to forcibly

medicate violates the professional judgment standard? Such a question raises
medical questions, and without expert testimony to controvert any explanations

proffered by the treating physician, the illusory protection afforded by the
Youngberg standard provide even less protection than originally anticipated.

See Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132, 135-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (no right to
independent psychiatric assistance in civil commitment proceedings).
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or fails to exercise his best judgment in the application of such
skill.1

12

When comparing the malpractice standard to the professional
judgment standard, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
concluded that the professional judgment standard provides even
less protection than malpractice laws. 113 The court stated that the
professional judgment standard is a "substantially less onerous
standard than negligence from the viewpoint of the public actor. ' 1 1 4 It requires a clinician only to exercise his professional
judgment in choosing a course of conduct. 11 5 Negligence, however, requires a professional to choose "from among alternatives,
116
a course of action consistent with the exercise of 'due care.'
This requires a physician to reject negligent alternatives that
might nonetheless satisfy the professional judgment standard. 11 7
The Third Circuit concluded that the professional judgment standard is akin to a recklessness or gross negligence standard and
falls somewhere between simple negligence and intentional misconduct. 118 In sum, because antipsychotic medication remains the
treatment of choice for schizophrenia or other psychoses, 119 the
professional judgment standard virtually guarantees psychiatrists
the opportunity to administer medication without interference
from the legal system.

112. E.g., Littlejohn v. State, 87 A.D.2d 951, 952, 451 N.Y.S.2d 225,
226 (3d Dep't 1982) (citing Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209-10, 49
N.E. 760 (1898)) (liability denied in a medical malpractice action because the
prison inmate failed to establish that state doctors did not possess the requisite
knowledge and skill as is possessed by an average member of the medical
profession, did not exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the application of
that professional judgment, and did not use their best judgment in the
application of that knowledge and skill).
113. See Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1990).
114. id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
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B. The Supreme Court'sAnalysis of An Individual'sSubstantive
Right to Refuse Medication in Washington v. Harper
In Washington v. Harper,120 the Supreme Court examined the
scope of an individual's substantive right to refuse medication.
Although the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
state may involuntarily treat a mentally ill prisoner absent a judicial hearing, 121the Court recognized that resolution of this question necessitated a determination of the "substantive rights at
stake." 122 The Court, in fact, determined that its grant of certiorari encompassed both issues. 123
In evaluating the protected liberty interests and the conditions
under which competing state interests might outweigh them; the
components of the substantive due process determination, 124 the
Court recognized that state law created a protected liberty interest
in refusing medication. State law creates a protected interest
when it contains language of an "unmistakably mandatory character."

125

The Court noted that Washington law permitted a

prison psychiatrist to forcibly medicate only if the prisoner suffered from a mental disorder and was "gravely disabled" or
126
posed a "likelihood of serious harm" to himself or others.

120. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
121. Id. at 1032.
122. Id. at 1036.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
125. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1026 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
471-72 (1983)) (mere fact that state creates careful procedural structure to
regulate use of administrative segregation does not indicate existence of
protected liberty interest, but it is only when this procedural structure is
clearly mandatory, and words such as "shall," "will," or "must" are used,
that the state has created a protected liberty interest); see supra note 90.
126. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033 n.3. The prison regulations adopted the
definitions of "mental disorder," "gravely disabled," and "likelihood of
serious harm" from the state's civil commitment law. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.020 (1990). The statute defined "mental disorder" as "any organic,
mental or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an
individual's cognitive or volitional functions." Id. § 71.05.020(2). "Gravely
disabled" was defined as:

a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) [i]s in
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The Court found that this state law created "a justifiable expectation on the part of the inmate that the drugs will not be administered unless these conditions exist." 12 7
In addition to state law, the Court found a constitutionally pro-tected interest to exist under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 8 However, the Court concluded that the
Federal Constitution did not provide any greater protection to
Mr. Harper than did state law. 129
The context of a prison setting defined Mr. Harper's right to
refuse medication. 130 The Court held that when scrutinizing a
challenged practice in such a setting, a court must ask only if the
regulation in question is "'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'

13 1

Such determination required an evaluation

of three factors. First, did a rational connection exist between the
prison regulation and the governmental interest which the regulation served? 132 Second, how will accommodation of the constitutional right impact upon others within the prison setting and on
the allocation of resources? 133 Finally, does the absence of ready
danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for
his essential human needs of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe
deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating

loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not
receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.
Id. § 71.05.020(1). The regulations defined "[l]ikelihood of serious harm" as:

(a) [a] substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an
individual upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to
commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self, (b) a substantial
risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another,
as evidenced by behavior which has caused harm or which places

another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm, or
(c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused

substantial loss or damage to the property of others.
Id. § 71.05.020(3).

127. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1037 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
132. Id.at 1038.
133. Id.
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alternatives evince the reasonableness, of the prison regulations?

13 4

The Court found that the forcible administration of medication
satisfied the very important government interest of maintaining
prison safety and providing treatment that will further the prisoner's medical interests and effectuate a safe prison environment. 135 The challenged policy served as a rational way of furthering these state objectives. 136 The Court reasoned that little
dispute exists within the psychiatric profession that antipsychotic
drugs constitute one of the most effective ways of treating and
controlling mental illness likely to cause violent behavior, and
that the regulations permit a psychiatrist to administer such medi137
cation for treatment purposes only.
Furthermore, although the prisoner in Harperwas never found
incompetent, the Court concluded that despite the absence of a
finding of incompetence, a constitutional right to refuse all
medication could not be successfully asserted. 138 The Court
reasoned that a contrary holding would ignore the legitimate state
interest in treatment for the purpose of reducing an inmate's
dangerousness. 139 Additionally, the prisoner in Harper failed to
establish that the use of seclusion and restraint served as effective
140
substitutes for the administration of antipsychotic medication.
The Court reasoned that those methods pose a risk of injury to
staff who promulgate such measures and place a toll on limited
prison resources. 141
The impact of Harperremains to be seen. The Court's analysis
of a patient's right to refuse medication under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment focused upon the right in the
context of a prison setting. 142 Hence, this portion of Harper may
134. Id.

135. Id. at 1038-39.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1036.
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have limited impact upon a civilly committed individual's right to
refuse drugs. However, Harper reaffirms the notion of Mills v.
Rogers,143 which holds that state law can serve as a source of an
individual's interest in refusing medication. 144 Accordingly,
when scrutinizing a civil patient's right to refuse medication
under the Federal Constitution, Harper requires a court to
scrutinize state law prior to adopting the professional judgment
standard.
C. ProceduralProtection Under the Federal Constitution
Afforded to Mentally Ill Individuals Who Wish to Refuse
Antipsychotic Medication
As a result of Washington v. Harper it is now well-settled that
the United States Constitution does not require a judge to approve
a decision to forcibly administer medication. 145 Rather, it may
well be that the due process clause requires only a decisionmaking process which results in a clinician exercising
professional judgment. 146 This portion of the Court's decision in
Harper is consistent with other decisions interpreting the
procedural protection imposed by the fourteenth amendment. 14 7
Before Harper,the two courts, other than the Second Circuit in
Project Release v. Prevost, that addressed the issue of the procedural requirements due prior to any forced drugging of a civil
patient, determined that any sort of administrative scheme that
reviewed a clinician's decision to medicate satisfied due process.
Prior to the Supreme Court's remand, in Rennie v Klein, 14 8 the
Third Circuit scrutinized an administrative scheme that provided
for an internal review of a psychiatrist's decision to administer
143. 457 U.S. 291 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
144. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
145. Id. at 1042.
146. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 306-09 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en band) (decision to administer medication by clinician constitutes base-line
decision, and due process is satisfied provided clinician exercises professional
judgment), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
147. See infra notes 148-79 and accompanying text.
148. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en band); see supra text accompanying
notes 92-94.
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medication over objection. 149 The review required the patient's

treatment team to evaluate any decisions to medicate. 15 0 If, after
such review, an impasse still existed, the procedures required the
medical director of the hospital, or a designee, to examine the
patient and review his hospital record. 15 1 If the director agreed
with the physician's decision, the facility could forcibly administer the medication. 152
In determining whether such procedures comported with the
fourteenth amendment, the court applied the criteria enunciated in
Mathews v. Eldridge.153 Mathews required the Third Circuit, in
Rennie, to scrutinize (1) the private interest involved, (2) the risk
of an erroneous decision as a result of the present procedures and
the value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards,
and (3) the governmental interest implicated by the proposed
additional procedures, including any fiscal or administrative bur54
dens that other procedural requirements would impose. 1
In its opinion, the Rennie court recognized that a patient retains
"'a residuum of liberty"' 155 and "correspondingly retains the
right to be free from 'unjustified intrusions on [his] personal security.' 15 6 The court found that the record below detailed
149. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 848-49 (citing New Jersey Division Of Mental
Health And Hospitals Administrative Bulletin 78-3).
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 848-49.
153. Id. at 848; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In

Mathews, the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether due process
requires the provision of an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of
social security disability benefits. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 322. The Court
examined prior holdings that focused on the due process questions and

concluded that due process requires application of the three distinct criteria
detailed above. Id. at 335. Mathews has evolved into the seminal due process

case with the Supreme Court relying upon its criteria whenever a procedural
due process question has arisen. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985) (provisions of psychiatric assistance to criminal defendant who raises
the insanity defense); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (blood grouping
tests provided to party in a paternity action).

154. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 848 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
155. Id. at 845 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).
156. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
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"dramatically" 15 7 how the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication impinged upon a patient's liberty interest. 158
The court noted that the plaintiffs suffered from aidnesia,
akathisia, and most significantly, tardive dyskinesia. 159 In addition, the court recognized that antipsychotic drugs also posed
risks of a variety of minor physical effects such as blurred vision,

dry mouth, constipation or diarrhea, skin rashes, faintness, and
fatigue. 160
However, the court concluded that the administrative procedures at issue posed only a "minor risk of erroneous deprivation," ' 161 and the additional procedural protection imposed by the
district court would not significantly reduce the risk involved. 162
The court reasoned that hospital staff spend more time with a patient than would an independent psychiatrist, and the "weeks or
months" 163 of staff-patient contact provide a reliable basis for
any decision to medicate. 164 The court relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Parhamv. J.R.,165 which held that "informal
157. Id. at 843.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 843-44.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 850.
162. Id. The district court previously ordered defendants to hold hearings to
determine whether the hospital could forcibly administer medication, appoint a
'patient advocate' to represent patients at the hearing, and hire independent
psychiatrists to serve as the decision-maker at the hearings. Id. at 840.
163. Id. at 850.
164. Id.
165. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham, the Supreme Court examined the
issue of what procedures the due process clause required when a parent or
guardian sought to hospitalize a child for mental illness. Id. at 607. In holding
that the due process clause does not require an adversarial hearing under these
circumstances, the Court applied the criteria in Mathews v. Eldridge. Id.; see
supra text accompanying notes 153-54. The Court held that the child possessed
a protected interest in avoiding erroneous incarceration, but the parents
possessed an interest in maintaining parental authority. Parham, 442 U.S. at
600-03. The state possesses an interest in avoiding the provisions of
unnecessary obstacles that discourage the mentally ill or their families from
seeking treatment. Id. at 605. The state also has a genuine interest in allocating
its resources to treatment and avoiding "time consuming procedural minuets
before the admission." Id. The Court further found that a formal adversarial
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traditional medical investigative techniques"' 166 do not violate
167
due process.
Finally, the Third Circuit examined the governmental interest
in avoiding fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by requiring independent decision-makers. The court concluded that the
requirements imposed by the district court would place a substantial financial burden on the state and require undue expenditures of staff time. 168 In addition, the court reasoned that an adversarial atmosphere would create stress rather than facilitate successful long-range treatment. 169 These concerns, together with
the other Mathews factors involved, required a determination that
the administrative procedures utilized by New Jersey satisfied due
70
process. 1

After the Supreme Court remanded Rennie in light of
Youngberg v. Romeo, 17 1 an en banc panel again examined the
procedures in question. 172 In an otherwise fragmented decision,
eight of the nine judges concluded that the "professional judgment" standard of Youngberg controlled. 173 Although the
Youngberg standard defines a patient's substantive legal rights,
the judges concluded that utilization of the administrative regulations in question required hospital staff to exercise professional
judgment whenever it decided to forcibly administer medication.

17 4

hearing would not enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding procedure. Id. at
606-07. The Court concluded that under these circumstances, an informal
examination conducted by a hospital physician does not violate due process.

Id.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Parham, 442 U.S. at 607.
Rennie, 653 F.2d 836, 850 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Id. at 851.
Id.

170. Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
172. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
173. Id. at 269-70, 272. The primary disagreement among the judges
consisted of whether due process required hospital staff to employ a "least
intrusive means" test when deciding whether to forcibly administer
medication. Id.
174. Id. at 270-71, 274, 277.
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In addition to the courts in Project Release v. Prevost and
Rennie, one additional federal court has examined the issue of
what procedures a state must follow prior to forcibly administering medication to a civil patient. 175 In R.A.J. v. Miller, the court
permitted forced drugging in the absence of a judicial determination that the patient lacked the capacity to make treatment decisions or otherwise satisfied any substantive criteria for forced
drugging. 176 The court held that an administrative procedure that
required a hospital clinical director to review the decisions of the
treating physician satisfied due process. 17 7 The procedure required an additional review from a consulting psychiatrist if the
clinical director determined that the patient understood the consequences of objecting to his proposed treatment. 178 The court held
that conformity with such procedures resulted in the exercise of
professional judgment, and that due process permits the forcible
administration of antipsychotic medication in the absence of a
judicial determination of incompetence. 17 9 If these cases left any
doubt that the Federal Constitution does not require a judicial determination of incompetence and, in the absence of relevant state
law, places substantial discretion within the hands of treating
physicians to administer medication, the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harper180 answered this question with reasonable certainty.
In Harper, the prison regulations authorized a prison psychiatrist to determine whether to administer medication. 18 1 If the inmate refused the medication, the prison was required to convene
a hearing before a special committee consisting of a psychiatrist,
a psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the prison,
none of whom could be involved with the patient's treatment or
diagnosis. 182
175. R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-25 (N.D. Tex. 1984).

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1322, 1325.
Id. at 1322-25.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1322-23.

180. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
181. Id. at 1033.
182. Id.
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The regulations provided certain minimal procedural protection. They required the prison to provide the inmate with twentyfour hours notice of the hearing, and the regulations prohibited
the prison from forcibly administering medication during this period. 183 The regulations further required the prison staff to provide the inmate with his tentative diagnosis, the factual basis for
such diagnosis, and why staff believed medication was necessary. 184 The prisoner had the right to attend the hearing, present
evidence, including witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 185 A lay advocate, who was not involved with the inmate's care; and who understood psychiatric issues, assisted
him. 186 The regulations also required the prison to take minutes
and provide a copy of the minutes to the prisoner. 187 If the inmate disagreed with the committee's determination, he could appeal the decision to the prison superintendent whom the regulations required to resolve the appeal within twenty-four hours. 188
The inmate could seek judicial review of any committee determination. 189
The regulation also required periodic review of any committee
decision. 190 Prison staff could medicate for fourteen days after
the initial hearing. The regulation permitted medication for an
additional 180 days after approval by the same committee who
reviewed the initial determination. After expiration of this latter
time period, the law required an additional review. 191
Prior to the hearing to examine the decision to medicate Mr.
Harper, prison staff met with the review committee on an ex
parte basis. 192 The committee then conducted a hearing, and a
nurse practitioner from another facility assisted the prisoner. 193
183. Id.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 1033-34.

187. Id. at 1034.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.

191. Id. n.4.
192. Id. at 1034.
193. Id.
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The committee determined that the inmate posed a danger to others as a result of mental disease or disorder and approved the
forcible administration of antipsychotic medication. 194
Once the Court determined the boundaries of Mr. Harper's
right to refuse medication, it focused upon what procedures the
Federal Constitution required the state to adhere to when reaching
a decision as to whether to forcibly medicate. In determining
what process the fourteenth amendment conferred, the Court focused upon the criteria enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.195
The Court described a prisoner's interest in refusing antipsychotic medication as "not insubstantial.,, 196 The Court recognized that the purpose of the drugs is to alter the brain's chemical
balance, and that the drugs produce numerous debilitating side-effects including acute dystonia, akathesia, neuroleptic malignant
197
syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the challenged procedures adequately protected the prisoner's interest in avoiding unwarranted medication and, perhaps, provided better protection
than a judicial hearing. 198 The Court reasoned that because drug
refusers frequently change their minds, a judge, whom the prisoner sought to serve as the ultimate decision-maker, often lacks
the capacity to adequately assess the individual's intentions. 19 9 In
addition, the Court found no reason why an untrained judge
could make a better decision than a specialist, and that a judicial
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1041. The criteria include the private interest at stake, the
governmental interest, including avoiding any administrative and procedural
burden, and the value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); supra text accompanying
notes 153-54.
196. Harper,110 S. Ct. at 1028.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1042.
199. Id. One must question the Court's focus upon a patient's intentions to
determine the adequacy of additional procedural safeguards. At the time of
refusal, the individual's intentions are clear, otherwise the government would
not seek to override the patient's decision. The role of the decision-maker is to
determine whether or not circumstances exist under which the state may
override the patient's expressed intentions.
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hearing would divert both the financial and personnel resources
of the prison. 2 00

The Court noted still other factors in concluding that the avail1
able procedures provided adequate process to the prisoner. 20 It
found that the decision-making committee did not lack adequate
independence since none of the committee members participated
in the inmate's treatment or diagnosis, and, in the absence of
factual findings, there was no reason to believe institutional bias
affected the committee's decision. 20 2 The Court also noted that
the regulations provided the prisoner with notice and the right to
cross-examine witnesses, which enabled him to meaningfully
challenge the decision to forcibly medicate. 20 3
Finally, the Court believed that neither the absence of a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard, nor the absence of counsel
violated due process. 20 4 The Court reasoned that such a standard
"is neither required nor helpful" when medical personnel make
the kind of judgments that the regulations require. 20 5 Similarly,
the Court concluded that little reason existed as to why due process required counsel, finding that the provision of an independent lay advisor who understands psychiatric issues does not violate due process. 2 06
III. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION UNDER
THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
Rivers v. Katz2 07 provided New York courts with an opportu-

nity to evaluate the right of a mentally ill individual to refuse
200. Id. at 1042-43.
201. Id. at 1043-44.

202. Id. at 1043.
203. Id. at 1044.
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Id. In debunking the necessity of counsel, the Court opined that "'[lit
is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to identify possible
errors in medical judgment."' Id. at 1044 (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985) (emphasis in original)).

207. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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medication under state law. In Rivers, three patients involuntarily
hospitalized at Harlem Valley Psychiatric Center sought to enjoin
the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication. 208 One of
the patients also sought to refuse lithium. 20 9 The patients in the
initial action were found to be "in need of involuntary care and
treatment," which meant, inter alia, that their judgment was so
impaired that they were unable to understand the need for inpatient care and treatment that was essential to their welfare. 2 10 All
three patients then objected, pursuant to title 14, section 27.8 of
the NYCRR, 2 11 to their proposed treatment regimen. 2 12 The
to
administrative decision-maker overruled the patients' objection
2 13
relief.
for
court
the
petitioned
treatment, and the individuals
The trial court rejected the patients' applications to refuse
medication. The court reasoned that because these individuals
were in need of involuntary hospitalization, the findings necessarily resulted in a determination that the patients lacked the ability to make a competent treatment decision. 2 14 The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed on the
grounds provided by the lower court. 2 15 However, the court of
appeals reversed holding that "the due process clause of the New
208. Id. at 490-91, 495 N.E.2d at 339-40, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77. Rivers
was a declaratory judgment proceeding commenced by two of the patients. Id.
at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The third individual
commenced a proceeding pursuant to the Civil Practice Law and Rules article
78. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The appellate division
consolidated both cases. Id.
209. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
210. Id. at 490, 495 N.E.2d at 339, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76; see supra note 2.
Such findings necessarily contained a determination that in the absence of
involuntary hospitalization, the patients posed a substantial threat of physical
harm to themselves or others. See cases cited supra note 9.
211. See supra note 77-78.
212. Id. at 490-92, 495 N.E.2d at 339-41, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76-78. For a
detailed description of the administrative procedures pursuant to which
defendants medicated the patients, see supra note 78.
213. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 490-92, 495 N.E.2d at 339-41, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
76-78.
214. Id. at 491-92, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
215. Rivers v. Katz, 112 A.D.2d 926, 491 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (2d Dep't
1985), rev'd, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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York State Constitution (art. 1, section 6) affords involuntarily
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse antipsy2 16
chotic medication."
The New York Court of Appeals found that New York
common law provided the patients with a right to refuse
medication as "every individual 'of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body"' 2 17 and "'control the course of his medical treatment.' ' 218 The court carefully detailed the need to extend this
common law right to individuals suffering from mental illness,
concluding that the state may not treat them "as persons of lesser
status or dignity because of their illness," ' 2 19 and stating: "'[I]f
the law recognizes the right of an individual to make decisions
about.., life out of respect for the dignity and autonomy of the
individual, that interest is no less significant when the individual
is mentally or physically ill.' ' 220 Not only does common law
protect a mentally ill individual, but the "fundamental commonlaw right is coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause of our State Constitution. " 22 1
The court did not grant the individuals an absolute right to
refuse medication. A compelling state interest will override such
right. 2 22 However, only when a patient is presently creating a
danger to himself, or others within the institution, does the state
have a compelling interest that overrides a competent patient's refusal. Furthermore, the state may justify the forced administration of medication on a temporary basis only for as long as the
emergency exists. 223 The court specifically rejected the assertion
216. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 340-41, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.

217. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,
105 N.E. 92 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).
218. Id. (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)).
219. Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (citing
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977)).
220. Id. (quoting In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980)).
221. Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
222. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
223. Id. at 495-96, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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that other state interests will override a patient's interest in determining the course of his own treatment. In fact, the court held
that whether considered individually or collectively, the state's
interests in providing a therapeutic environment, in conserving
staff resources, facilitating the process of deinstitutionalization,
and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, do
not outweigh the patient's fundamental right. 224
Absent an emergency or other temporary dangerous situation,
only a determination that the patient lacks the capacity to make a
reasoned treatment decision justifies the overriding of a patient's
interest in determining his own course of treatment. 225 However,
the previous findings that the patients' judgments were so impaired that they did not understand that in-patient care and treatment was essential to their welfare did not serve as a sufficient
basis to conclude they lacked the capacity to make treatment decisions. 226 The court reasoned that mental illness frequently impairs functioning on a limited basis, leaving other areas unimpaired, and many mentally ill individuals are able to function in a
competent manner. 227
By concluding that a determination that (1) a person is in need
of in-patient care and treatment essential to his welfare and (2)
the patient is unable to understand the need for in-patient care and
treatment does not constitute a determination of incompetence,
the court of appeals corrected a significant error committed by
the courts below in which they ignored the "profound distinction" 2 28 between commitment and incompetence. 2 29 A determination that a patient lacks the ability to understand the need for
care and treatment deemed essential to his welfare means only
that a doctor or legal fact-finder has determined that the individual did not understand the utility of in-patient care and treatment
224. Id. at 495 n.6, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 n.6.
225. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
226. Id. at 493-94, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79.

227. Id. at 494, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
228. Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 368 Mass.
631, 633, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1975).

229. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493-94, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
78-79.
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at the time of hospitalization. In other words, because the patient
rejects the option of in-patient treatment, such individual does not
understand that in-patient treatment is more important to him than
the loss of liberty from which he suffers as a result of commitment.
However, whether or not care and treatment "is essential" to
one's welfare is simply a value judgment rendered by a physician
at the time of admission and by a judge at the conclusion of a retention proceeding. For instance, one judge may conclude that
treatment will raise one's standard of living, constituting treatment that is essential to welfare; another fact-finder may
disagree.
Consequently, a hearing to determine whether or not an individual is in need of involuntary care and treatment focuses on
criteria different from what a fact-finder must address when assessing competence. The latter focuses upon whether or not a patient is so lacking in his mental faculties that he lacks the ability
to comprehend the nature of the proposed treatment. 230 In other
words, a competence determination focuses upon whether or not
an individual can adequately understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of the proposed treatment. 23 1 A patient found
to require "involuntary care and treatment" who wishes to refuse
medication might have rational reasons for both. For instance, he
may contest any attempts to hospitalize him because he does not
want to risk losing his present living arrangement. Furthermore,
he may choose liberty instead of living behind locked doors on a
ward full of dangerous individuals. Nor may he want to utilize
what may amount to limited resources, such as a social security
check, to pay for hospitalization. 2 32 Once hospitalized, a patient
may merely disagree with the dosage or the particular drug
prescribed. When one recognizes that psychiatrists in public
230. See Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N.Y. 85, 87-88, 30 N.E. 264, 265 (1892).
231. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(c) (McKinney 1988).
232. See Id. §§ 43.01-.11 (Commissioner of Mental Health permitted to
assess care and treatment charges); Kriegbaum v. Katz, 909 F.2d 70, 74 (2d
Cir. 1990) (state permitted to bill against social security benefits to satisfy care

and treatment charges).
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psychiatric hospitals frequently err when diagnosing patients, 23 3
even in the absence of any side effects, a patient may have good
reason to refuse the proposed treatment. Furthermore, the fear of
23 4
side effects may well result in a patient refusing medications,
but the prescribing psychiatrist may well minimize or ignore such
problems when deciding to administer the treatment. 23 5 Under
such circumstances, the decision to refuse medication may well
be reasoned. Thus, a decision that a patient requires involuntary
care and treatment does not amount to a determination that such
individual lacks the ability to make a reasoned decision to reject
medication. One commentator has noted that:
[a]t issue in deciding whether to respect a person's hospitalization and treatment refusal is his decision making competence,
that is, the person's ability, within reasonable, culturally determined limits, to attend to and weigh data relevant to the decision
whether to accept or reject hospitalization and treatment. This
type of determination focuses on the person's ability to perform
the process of deciding rather than on the final decision.
Focusing on this process avoids the logical fallacy of assuming
that because a decision seems inexplicable, disturbing, or irrational in a given instance or series of instances, it must be true
that the decisiomnaker is incapable of rational decisionmaking. 2 3 6

Accordingly, the court of appeals recognized that despite
mental illness, many individuals retain the capacity to make
knowledgeable decisions about medication. Simply because a
233. Gelman, supra note 37, at 1755; Brooks, supra note 24, at 352 n.42.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 32-72.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
236. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 632-33 (1978) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Morse]. Mental health laws that permit forced treatment on the
basis of a determination of the need for care and treatment are premised upon
the syllogism that since a patient needs treatment and has not obtained it, the
decision not to seek treatment is wrong and indicates that the individual is
incompetent. The decision-making capacity of a person deemed incompetent
under this standard is not necessarily awry. See also Roth, Meisel & Lidz,
Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatments, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279,
281 (1977).
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patient disagrees with a psychiatrist's judgment about the benefit
of medication does not mean that such a decision is an incompe7
tent one. 23
Furthermore, by equating a finding of the need for involuntary
care and treatment to a finding of incompetence, the lower courts
violated the most basic tenets of due process, as set forth in Cole
v. Arkansas.2 38 New York law states unequivocally that:
No order or determination ... that a person is in need of involuntary care and treatment or that there was need for retention of
such person shall be construed or deemed to be a determination
or finding that such person is incompetent or is unable adequately to conduct his personal or business affairs. 239
Hence, New York law notifies a patient that his decision-making capacity is not an issue in a retention proceeding. 2 40
Accordingly, because the administration of antipsychotic medication implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest that requires due process protection, 24 1 the state may not piggyback a
finding of incompetence upon a finding that an individual requires involuntary care and treatment.
In Cole, the state charged and convicted three defendants of
violating section 2 of an Arkansas statute that prohibited unlawful
assemblage at a labor dispute. 242 The defendants appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support
their convictions. 243 Instead of addressing the defendants' contentions, the state supreme court recognized that the defendants
were charged with the use of violence, and section 1 of the same
statute under which the defendants were convicted prohibited
237. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986).

238. 333 U.S. 196 (1948); see infra text accompanying notes 242-47.
239. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.03 (McKinney 1988).
240. Little question exists that if the state wished to challenge a patient's

competence, due process requires the state to provide adequate notice. See
Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455, 461 (1917); Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76,
78-79 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
241. Washington v. Harper, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036 (1990).

242. Cole, 333 U.S. at 197-98.
243. Id. at 197.
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such violence. 244 Under these circumstances, the court affirmed
the convictions "without invoking any parts of § 2 of the
Act." 2 45 In other words, the court affirmed the convictions as
though the state had tried defendants for violating section 1, an
offense for which they were neither tried nor convicted. 2 46
The United States Supreme Court overturned the convictions
holding that due process required notice of the specific charges
and an opportunity to contest the issues raised by that charge:
If, as the State Supreme Court held, petitioners were charged
with a violation of § 1, it is doubtful both that the information
fairly informed them of that charge and that they sought to defend themselves against such a charge; it is certain that they
were not tried for or found guilty of it. It is as much a violation
of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction
of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made. 2 47
Consequently, if the Supreme Court prohibited the State of
Arkansas from convicting defendants of crimes for which they
were not charged, New York could not then equate the need for
involuntary care and treatment with a finding of incompetence.
Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals held that if the
state wishes to establish that a patient lacks the capacity to make a
treatment decision, it must obtain this finding in court, 248 as

"[s]uch a determination is uniquely a judicial, not a medical
function." 249 Furthermore, the state must prove a patient's
incompetence by "clear and convincing evidence," 25 0 and at the
hearing, the state must provide the patient with counsel. 25 1
Additionally, the state may not automatically forcibly medicate
a patient upon a finding of incompetence. If a court determines a
244. Id. at 200-01.
245. ld. at 200.
246. Id. at 201.
247. Id. (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937)).
248. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343-44, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986).
249. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
250. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
251. Id.
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patient to be incompetent, it must further determine that "the
proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect
to the patient's liberty interest." 252 Such a determination requires
scrutiny of the patient's best interest, the side effects associated
with the treatment, and any less intrusive treatments. 25 3
IV. CONTRASTING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL AND THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The contrasting decisions of Rivers, on one side, and Project
Release v. Prevost254 and Washington v. Harper,255 on the other,
serve to highlight the differences in approach taken by the New
York courts and the federal courts. In Rivers, both common law
and the state constitution served as a basis for a patient's right to
refuse. By utilizing common law as a basis for its decision, the
court of appeals required the finder of fact to focus upon the patient: did the patient possess the capacity to refuse medication?
By utilizing incompetence as a threshold which the state must
prove in order to have the ability to override a patient's refusal,
the court of appeals signaled that it viewed the issue of refusal as
legal. 256 Once it recognized that competence amounted to a determination that "is uniquely a judicial, not a medical function, '257 the court, although-it eschewed any authority, had substantial basis to impose a clear and convincing standard upon the
state. 25 8 Unlike the Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper,259
252. Id.
253. Id. at 497-98, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
254. 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 7590.

255. 110 S. Ct. 1036 (1990); see supra text accompanying notes 120-44.
256. MHL article 78 sets forth the procedures for declaring a citizen

incompetent. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 78.01-.31 (McKinney 1988).
Section 78.01 confers jurisdiction upon state supreme court to determine this

issue. Id. § 78.01. Hence, while such a determination may require expert
medical testimony, by definition, it constitutes a legal determination.

257. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
258. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (clear and
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the New York Court of Appeals found that the right to counsel
attaches at a medication hearing. 260
The Court in Harperrejected the notion that in non-emergency
situations the issue of competence defines the boundaries of an
individual's right to refuse. 26 1 Rather, the Court concluded that
the state possessed an interest in maintaining institutional order
and safety, and as long as the decision to forcibly medicate was
reasonably related to such interest, the fourteenth amendment
does not prohibit forced drugging. 262 Although the Supreme
Court found that, pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, a prisoner possesses a protected liberty interest in refusing medication, 263 the Court held that the state's prison regulations adequately protected that interest. 2 64 Under the regulations, the decision to forcibly medicate an inmate required a determination of
two medical questions: did the prisoner suffer from mental illness, and if so, did the prisoner, as a result of the illness, pose a
danger to himself, others, or property? 265 Because the prison
regulations addressed medical determinations, the Court held that
a clear and convincing evidentiary standard was neither "required
nor helpful." ' 266 Similarly, the Court held, reasoning in a rather
convincing standard of proof required in a commitment hearing because, inter

alia, "[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the
risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater
than any possible harm to the state").
259. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1044; see supra text accompanying notes 20406.
260. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
The court of appeals apparently based its conclusion on the fact that counsel
attaches not on constitutional law, but rather state statutory law. Id. The court
cited as authority Judiciary Law section 35(1)(a) which authorizes, inter alia,

assignment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings of an individual alleged to
suffer from mental illness and confined to a state institution, or in civil
proceedings to commit or transfer a person to a state institution. Id. (citing
N.Y. JuD. LAW § 35(1)(a) (McKinney 1990)).
261. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037.
262. Id. at 1037-38.
263. Id. at 1036.

264. Id. at 1042-43.
265. Id. at 1042.
266. Id. at 1044.
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conclusive fashion, that the fourteenth amendment did not require
67
counsel. 2
Like the Supreme Court in Harper, the Second Circuit in
Project Release v. Prevost268 also adopted a deferential standard
to clinicians, concluding that a physician can forcibly medicate as
long as such decision satisfied minimally accepted professional
standards. 269 By holding that the procedures in question satisfied
due process, the court correctly recognized that the United States
Constitution does not require a court to approve the forcible administration of medication. 2 70 The regulations at issue in Project
Release authorized the use of counsel. 27 1 Hence, the case did not
require the court to resolve this issue. It also did not address the
issue of burden of proof. However, because the court upheld the
regulations in question, the court implicitly found that due process does not impose such a standard.
To the extent that laws define societal norms and moral precepts, 272 decisions by the New York State Court of Appeals,
United States Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, reflect societal values. Accordingly, to the extent
that these courts either broadly or narrowly define a patient's
substantive right to refuse medication, or provide or withhold
substantial procedural protection, the decisions by these courts
reflect a societal interest in defining the scope of individual autonomy provided to mentally ill individuals. These decisions also
reflect a societal recognition in providing sufficient protection in
order to ensure that the state does not erroneously override a patient's interest in refusing medication while, at the same time,
minimizing the administrative and fiscal obstacles to the state in
267. Id. ("the provision of an independent lay advisor who understands the

psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection").
268. 722 F.2d 960, 980 (2d Cir. 1983).
269. Id. at 980.
270. Id. at 981.
271. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.8(d) (1962); supra
note 78.

272. See, e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1979) (function of a judge is "to give
proper meaning to our public values").
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its attempt to further a legitimate state interest. 273
In determining the scope of an individual's substantive right to
refuse medication, a court must balance "'the liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an organized society.' 274 This
requires a court to weigh "the individual's interest in liberty
against the State's asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty." 275 Hence, by concluding that (1) all hospitalized patients
are presumed competent and (2) not only does state common and
statutory law afford patients a right to refuse medication, 2 76 but
so does the state constitution, the New York Court of Appeals
merely holds that an individual's interest in determining his own
course of treatment, which includes the right to reject drugs that
may produce debilitating side effects, outweighs the state interest
in providing treatment that a professional deems necessary or appropriate. On the other hand, by adopting the professional judgment standard in ProjectRelease,277 or the reasonably related to
penological objectives standard in Harper,2 78 the federal courts
subscribe to doctrines that render irrelevant the decision-making
capacity of the individual. Instead, such standards require the patient to prove the inappropriateness of the decision to medicate.
The decision in Rivers is the far wiser approach. Both state and
federal courts have recognized that the state interest in providing
necessary medical treatment does not, in the absence of dangerousness, outweigh a patient's interest in physical liberty under the
fourteenth amendment. 279 Furthermore, the fourteenth amend273. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see supra
note 153.

274. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
275. Id.
276. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 33.01 (McKinney 1988) (stating that
no person shall forfeit any civil right solely because he receives services for
mental disability), cited with approval in, Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,
494, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986).
277. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 980 (2d Cir. 1983); see
supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.

278. Harper, 110 S.Ct. at 1036; see supra text accompanying notes 13041.
279. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) ("committed
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ment protects the right of a competent patient to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. 2 80 Historically, the right to bodily autonomy
has been deemed fundamental. 28 1 This, in and of itself, may require that the Federal Constitution impose broad substantive protection since the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the
fourteenth amendment protects the same liberties that the common law protects. 282 It is well-settled that common law protects
the right of a competent individual to refuse treatment that a
physician may deem beneficial. 2 83 If the due process clause protects common law rights, why shouldn't the fourteenth amendment afford institutionalized individuals with a broad right to
refuse medication; a right that is consistent with common law?
One authority responds to this assertion by arguing that it is the
existence of mental illness that should enable the state to treat
individuals differently. 2 84 He argues that civil commitment ex[insanity] acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is

no longer dangerous") (emphasis added); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 576 (1975) (state may not confine a nondangerous individual who can

survive safely in freedom); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298,
1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("due process does not tolerate the involuntary

commitment of a nondangerous individual"), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.
1983); In re Harry, 96 A.D.2d 201, 206, 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64 (2d

Dep't 1987) (due process does not countenance the involuntary hospitalization
of a nondangerous individual even if the state provides treatment some deem
beneficial).
280. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851

(1990) (Court held that Constitution does not preclude the State of Missouri
from applying a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when determining
whether an incompetent individual expressed wishes regarding the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment).
281. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own

person ...").

282. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679 n.47 (1977); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes the enjoyment of all
privileges recognized by common law as essential to the pursuit of happiness).
283. Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the
Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1720, 1736 & n. 148

(1982).
284. Appelbaum, supra note 3, at 417.
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2 85
emplifies how the law permits the state to intervene clinically.

As one court noted, "[n]onconsensual treatment is what involuntary commitment is all about." 2 86 However, these assertions are
not correct.
It is not the existence of mental illness that permits the state to
treat such individuals differently than their non-mentally ill
counterparts; it is the existence of dangerousness. 2 87 If there was
any doubt as to the proposition that dangerousness triggers the
state interest in confinement, the Supreme Court began to erase it
when it held that the state may preventively detain a defendant
before trial to prevent his alleged danger to the community. 288 In
Salerno, arrestees challenged the provisions of the Bail Reform
Act which included, inter alia, a provision authorizing the pretrial detention of a defendant charged with certain serious felonies
if release conditions will not reasonably ensure the safety of any
other person in the community. 28 9 The Court concluded that this
legislation did not amount to punishment but amounted to a valid
regulatory scheme designed to prevent danger to the
community. 2 90 The Court recognized that "the Government's
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest." ' 29 1 The
285. Id. (In favoring a treatment driven model for a patient's right to refuse
antipsychotic medication over a rights driven model, Appelbaum reasons that
the "[d]eprivation of liberty of the mentally ill rests on the prospects that their
disorders will be treated -benefitting both society and the patients themselves and that treatment will allow them to be restored to freedom.") Id. at 414-17.
286. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 135 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
287. See cases cited supra notes 9, 279.

288. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (pre-trial detention of
arrestees charged with thirty-five counts under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act did not constitute deprivation of their due process
or eighth amendment rights because arrestees posed a potential danger to
society). The Supreme Court may further clarify this issue. It will soon decide
State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1990), cert. granted, No. 90-5844

(1991) (WESTLAW, Supreme Court library) (Can a state require an insantityaequittee, who no longer suffers from mental illness, to also prove he is no
longer dangerous before he can be released?).

289. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982).
290. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-48.
291. Id. at 748.
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Court also recognized that it had held in numerous other contexts
that the state could confine individuals who present a danger to
the community. 2 92 The Court stated that under these
circumstances, preventative detention does not offend "some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
2 93
our people as to be ranked as fundamental. "
295 civil
After O'Connor v. Donaldson294 and its progeny,
commitment is about both preventing harm to oneself or others
and providing treatment. 296 However, from a constitutional per297
spective, the provision regarding treatment is only secondary.
In virtually every state today, an involuntarily hospitalized pa-

tient remains legally competent. 298 The prevalence of such practice indicates that the notion that institutionalized mentally ill individuals remain competent is so rooted in the law that the due
process clause should incorporate this principle. 299 Accordingly,
292. Id. at 748-49 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)); see
supra note 258.
293. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934).
294. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
295. See cases cited supra note 279.
296. See Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (purpose of confinement is
treatment).
297. See Society For Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737
F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir. 1984) (right to only such treatment that will prevent
basic self-care skills from deteriorating); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S 307,
330 (1982) (Burger, C.J. concurring) (other than assistance to avoid
unnecessary restraint and harm, the Constitution does not place an affirmative
duty upon the state to provide any sort of training). Youngberg and Society For
Goodwill involved mentally retarded plaintiffs. The nature of the disability,
mental retardation, resulted in the courts addressing the right to "treatment" as
the right to "habilitation." See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309 n. 1. From a legal
standpoint, no principled distinction exists between the requirements of
providing treatment to a mentally ill individual and habilitation to a mentally
retarded person. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 273 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Seitz, C.J., concurring).
298. See S. 'BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 405-08 (3d ed. 1985).

299. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984) (quoting Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)) ("The fact that a practice is followed by a
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by failing to define the right of a civilly committed individual to
refuse medication in non-emergency situations by competence,
the Second Circuit and all other courts that adopted the professional judgment standard, trivialize the notion that involuntarily
hospitalized patients should have any substantial degree of autonomy. The professional judgment standard results in courts con'30 0
struing any decision to medicate as a "base-line decision,"
which is presumptively valid. 30 1 Indeed, the recognition that
there is general disagreement between the psychiatric and psychological professions as to the severity of side effects 302 hardly justilies shifting the risk of error to the patient. Rather, because
states universally treat civil committees as competent adults, the
constitution should permit these individuals to individually assess
the risks and benefits.
The justification for permitting physicians to administer antipsychotic medication over objection is the notion that physicians
are better trained to make treatment decisions, and patients
should trust doctors to make these decisions. 3 03 Such a concept,
coupled with the notion that a broad right-to-refuse interferes
with clinical management, 30 4 results in the adoption of the professional judgment standard. However, ample reason exists to
believe that doctors do not know what is best; they err regularly
and frequently, 30 5 and a treatment bias pervades many of their
large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that

practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in
determining whether the practice 'offends some principle of justice so rooted

in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."').

300. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1988).
301. Id. at 310 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 & n.30).
302. Id. at 310-11.

303. See Appelbaum, supra note 3, at 414; Kaufinann, Roth, Lidz &
Meisel, Informed Consent and Patient Decisionmaling, 4 INr'L J. L. &
PsYcHIATRY 345, 346 (1981) [hereinafter Kaufmann & Roth].

304. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz,
C.J, concurring) (hospital staff must make complex decisions, which they are
in the best position to evaluate).

305. See Brooks, supra note 24, at 352 n.42; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption ofExpertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF.
L. RE v. 693, 708-09 (1974).
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decisions. 3° 5 Moreover, even if one chooses to believe that psychiatrists are substantially wiser than their mentally ill patients,
the law should not confer decision-making authority on treating
physicians.
If psychiatrists are wiser than their mentally ill patients, they
are no doubt wiser than the general adult population whom the
state does not confine, at least in respect to questions of
medicine. Yet, the law, through the concept of informed consent,
permits non-mentally ill individuals to overrule any suggestion by
their physicians. 307 For no reason other than the state should
treat mentally ill individuals as similarly as possible to individuals
who do not suffer from a mental disability until a court adjudicates an involuntarily hospitalized patient incompetent, the civilly
committed patient should have the right to make his own
treatment decisions. Under this view, it is not mental illness that
justifies different treatment; rather it is a determination that the
individual labeled "mentally ill" lacks the ability to make a
reasoned treatment decision.
Critics of Rivers v. Katz and other broad right to refuse treatment holdings argue that most patients refusing medication are
not competent and, furthermore, patients do not refuse drugs because of the side effects. 30 8 They point out further that invariably
a court will override a patient's refusal and authorize treatment. 30 9 Finally, psychiatrists lament the difficulty in treating
patients when patients can assert a right to refuse. 3 10 However,
306. See Morse, supra note 236, at 599; Wexler & Scoville, The
Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 100 (1971).
307. Indeed, just as many psychiatrists oppose a broad right to refuse

medication, the medical profession has attacked the concept of informed
consent. See Kaufmann & Roth, supra note 303, at 345. Similar to the notion
that mentally ill individuals lack the ability to make reasoned decisions, many
physicians believe they are better trained than their patients to make medical

decisions. See, e.g., Kaufmann & Roth, supra note 303, at 346; Schwartz
&Vingiano, supra note 3, at 1054.
308. See, e.g., Drug Refusal, supra, note 4, at 342-44; Appelbaum &
Gutheil, supra note 4, at 310-14; Schwartz & Vingiano, supra note 3, at 1049.
309. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 3, at 417.
310. Drug Refusal, supra note 4, at 345.
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these critics argue fallaciously because neither the court of appeals in Rivers, nor any other court has found that patients possess an absolute right to refuse. 311 Rather, these courts merely
start from the premise that an involuntarily hospitalized patient
does not automatically forfeit a substantial degree of autonomy
because of involuntary hospitalization. Accordingly, the New
York Court of Appeals subscribes to a judicial philosophy that
chooses to maximize patient autonomy; a philosophy inherently
different from the notion that "[i]nvoluntary confinement represents a transfer from the patient to the State of the authority to
make certain decisions affecting the patient's welfare, "' 3 12 and
the state is empowered to make additional decisions that affect
the patient's welfare. 3 13
The New York Court of Appeals still permits the state to
forcibly medicate those individuals who lack the ability to make a
reasoned treatment decision. 314 Furthermore, studies that detail
the rate in which courts override a patient's refusal should not
justify elimination of such a starting point. 3 15 They fail to account for the ability of patients to negotiate a treatment regimen
with their psychiatrist as a result of the psychiatrist no longer
being able to impose his authority without subjecting such decision to judicial scrutiny. Patients now possess far greater ability
to submit to a treatment regimen in which they and their doctor
concur. 3 16 This ability to negotiate results from physicians
choosing to reach an amicable accommodation with a patient in3 17
stead of preparing for and appearing in court.
Additionally, the requirement of a court hearing does not create
311. See supra text accompanying notes 222-23.
312. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1983) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring).
313. Id. Chief Judge Seitz justified such transfer of authority upon the

state's interest in aiding the patient's welfare. Id. However, he relied on no
authority for this assertion, and the state's interest in assisting a competent
individual through treatment has not been deemed compelling. See supra note
279.

314. See supra text accompanying note 225.
315. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1043 n.13 (1990).
316. Brooks, supra note 24, at 369.

317. Id.
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an insurmountable burden. New York law authorizes a party
seeking relief of a summary nature to institute a special proceeding. 3 18 This enables the facility seeking to override a patient's
objection to present its case within eight days. 3 19 If there is a
reason for a hearing within a shorter amount of time, the facility
can place the matter on the court calendar by means of an order
to show cause, 320 which will result in the court determining the
hearing date. 32 1 Eight days is not much longer than the five days
an involuntarily hospitalized patient must wait prior to obtaining
a court hearing to challenge his hospitalization. 322 It is substantially shorter than the length of time it took the New York State
Office of Mental Health to complete its administrative review of
patients pursuant to NYCRR section 27.7 prior to Rivers. 323
Similarly, a court rather than an administrative reviewer should
serve as the fact-finder. Whether or not a medical professional
who serves as a fact-finder adequately protects a patient's interest324 should not justify the countenancing of administrative review by a professional. There may be many instances in which an
unbiased fact-finder might serve, or appear to serve, the interests
of individuals whose rights are at issue. For instance, could a
legislature delegate to a special agency the authority to resolve all
allegations of malpractice? Might the legislature direct that all
other tort claims be resolved by means of an alternative dispute
resolution in which the fact-finder does not apply the rules of
evidence? I do not believe so.
American society, whose rule of law is derived from the common law model, relies upon the "courts, or other quasi-judicial
official bodies ' 3 25 to. resolve disputes and define the scope of
318. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 401-411 (McKinney 1990).
319. Id. § 403(b).
320. Id. § 403(d).
321. 2A J. WEINSTEiN, H. KoRN & A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CwiL
PRACTICE 2214.04 subdiv. d, at 77 (1991).
322. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 1988).
323. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1986) (Appellant's Memorandum In Opposition to Motion to Reargue at 13).
324. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042 (1990).
325. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
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individuals' rights and duties. Accordingly, instead of focusing
upon whether medical professionals can adequately serve a patient's interest, one should focus upon whether the decision to
forcibly administer medication impacts upon the individual interest in maintaining bodily autonomy to such a degree that a court
should serve as the body that resolves the dispute between a patient and his doctor. If the law requires a court to adjudicate allegations of malpractice or the administration of medication in the
absence of informed consent, and the boundaries of the
Constitution are frequently included upon the common law's
definition of rights and obligations, 326 why shouldn't the
Constitution require a judicial determination when the state seeks
to violate the bodily integrity of an individual by administering,
over objection, medication that can produce the most debilitating
of effects? 3 2 7

The rationale provided by the Supreme Court to justify utilization of an administrative review is particularly disturbing. The
Supreme Court cited Youngberg v. Romeo32 8 and Parham v.
J.R. 3 2 9 as authority for examples when the Court permitted

medical professionals to make decisions that impacted upon the
legal rights of patients. These decisions hardly amount to persuasive authority. The Constitution required the professionals in
Youngberg to make decisions about patient treatment in their capacity as service providers, 330 an action far different than serving
as an administrative fact-finder to determine whether or not the
criteria for overriding a patient's objection existed. Similarly,
Parhamaddressed the issue of whether a decision by an admitting
psychiatrist to hospitalize a minor whose parents sought such
hospitalization satisfied due process. 33 1 The Parham Court recognized the need to avoid an entirely adversarial posture within
326. See supra text accompanying notes 280-82; Cruzan v. Director,

Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859-60 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 32-72.
328. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

329. 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see supra note 165.
330. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322.
331. Parham,442 U.S. at 601-02.
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commitment proceedings of minor juveniles. In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon, inter alia, the need to maintain parent-child relations and the inherent authority of parents to make
decisions about matters affecting their children. 332 These concerns are not present when a clinician wishes to administer medications over the objection of a legally competent adult.
The Court in Harperjustified utilization of an administrative
review because patients often change their minds and a court will
lack the ability to assess the intentions of the refusing individual. 333 However, the independent decision-makers countenanced
by the Court in Harperwere not involved in the inmate's current
treatment or diagnosis. 334 Are such individuals better suited than
a court to assess an individual's intentions? Finally, the Court,
relying upon Parham, concluded that requiring a judicial proceeding will divert both money and staff from the care of mentally ill inmates. 335 This may amount to an unjustified concern.
Psychiatry is a profession that, as a whole, seeks to ensure that
patients receive treatment deemed beneficial. 336 Accordingly,
one may anticipate and would certainly hope that those
phychiatrists, whom the law requires to appear in court, would
simply work longer hours to ensure that patients receive
appropriate treatment. Hospital administrators should send the
following message to those psychiatrists whose time in court
results in less time for patient care: "You are professionals -work harder." Any psychiatrist who would sacrifice patient care
because of the administrative-like details connected with a
judicial proceeding should not be employed in public psychiatric
facilities.
In addressing whether the Constitution requires the appointment
332. Id. at 602, 610; see supra note 165.

333. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042 (1990).
334. Id. at 1043.
335. Id. at 1042.

336. See Appelbaum & Hamn, Decisions to Seek Commitment: Psychiatric
Decision Making in a Legal Context, 39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 447
(1982); Mulvey & Lidz, Back to Basics: A CriticalAnalysis of Dangerousness

Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 L. HUMAN BEHAVIOR 209, 214
(1985); Wexler & Scoville, supranote 306, at 101.
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of counsel to those individuals who refuse medication, the
Supreme Court failed to address relevant concerns. Whether the
right to counsel attaches requires a balancing of the criteria detailed in Mathews v. Eldridge,337 which a court must then measure against the presumption that counsel does not attach because
the state does not seek to deprive an individual of physical liberty. 338 Because this evaluation requires a balancing of individual
and state interests, 339 the outcome may well depend upon a
court's determination of the extent of an individual interest in
avoiding medication. Those of us who believe the patient possesses an extremely significant interest in avoiding forced drugging will conclude that such interest, together with the value of
counsel in avoiding erroneous determinations, results in a determination that the Constitution requires counsel; those who place
less significance upon this patient interest, will not.
Compounding the difficulty in assessing whether counsel attaches have been the inconsistent approaches the Supreme Court
has taken when defining the contours of the fourteenth amendment's right to counsel. In the absence of a judicial proceeding,
the administrative proceedings provided to a patient may be for340
mal and complex or they may be simple and straight-forward.
Under such circumstances it may be "'neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel
337. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
338. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
339. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
340. CompareRennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1150-51 (D.N.J. 1978)

(codification of the administrative procedures at issue within the case, namely,
the New Jersey Division Of Mental Health And Hospitals Administrative
Bulletin 78-3, was appended to the court's decision and provides for an
informal medical review conducted by the medical director of the hospital (or a
designee) granting discretion on the part of the director to obtain an
independent psychiatric consultation) with MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.

§§ 10-708(a)(2), (c)(1) (1990) (statutory provisions contain a detailed
administrative procedure held before a clinical review panel, affording the
opportunity, inter alia, to present witnesses, to cross-examine those witnesses

called by the clinical review panel and to utilize counsel at the phase of review
before an administrative law judge).
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is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements
.... ,,341 Under this view, the complexity of the administrative
proceeding or the individual patient's clinical condition might determine whether or not counsel is necessary.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also concluded that a
court must measure due process by the generality of cases to
which the procedural requirement in question applies. 342 In other
words, what "is sufficient for the large majority [of cases] ...

is

by constitutional definition sufficient for all of them." 343 Under
this view, the complexity of the question of whether mental
illness exists, taken together with the relevant substantive
standard, be it competence, professional judgment, best interest,
least intrusive, or a combination of such, militates towards a determination that counsel should attach. 344 The state possesses an
interest in avoiding the expense of counsel. However, this interest is hardly significant. 345 Moreover, those states like New York
that establish an organization to provide legal services to institutionalized individuals in matters of commitment and/or care and
treatment, 3 46 could utilize the state funded legal service organizations to represent patients. While counsel might alter the nature
of the proceeding by making it more adversarial, 347 because a
patient's interest in bodily autonomy is so great, application of
the Mathews criteria results in overcoming the presumption that
counsel should not attach because the state does not seek to de341. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
790 (1973)).
342. Walter v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330
(1985) ("'[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions."') (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344
(1976)).
343. Id.

344. Cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (no right to counsel for petitioner
because, inter alia, "no expert witnesses testified, and the case presented no
specially troublesome points of law").
345. Id. at 28.
346. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 47.01-.03 (McKinney 1988).

347. Walter v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325
(1985).
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prive an individual of liberty.
CONCLUSION

There are numerous reasons why Rivers is a significant decision. 348 However, its most important aspect may be that the New
York Court of Appeals found that the state constitution permits a
patient to refuse medication, not because such individual possesses an inherent interest in refusing potentially debilitating
drugs, but rather because, despite hospitalization, such person
possesses the right to determine his own course of treatment. 349
Pursuant to Rivers, not only may a patient refuse medication, but
because the court of appeals based its holding upon the common
law right of an individual to control his own course of treatment, 350 hospital staff must provide affirmative treatment in accordance with a patient's wishes. Accordingly, Rivers arguably
gives new meaning to an old adage, and one can envision proponents of a narrow right to refuse decrying about, inmates running
the asylum. But is this an accurate assessment of Rivers?
I do not believe so. Rivers simply accords greater individual
autonomy to patients whose day to day activities, while hospitalized, are controlled by others. 35 1 The decision exemplifies how
society no longer views the institutionalized mentally ill as people
that society shuns and who are not deserving of the same legal
protection afforded to "normal" individuals. 352 As a result of
Rivers, civil commitment does not result in a patient forfeiting
the exercise of one of the most basic rights belonging to individuals -the right of bodily autonomy. 353 Because Rivers enables the
state to treat, over objection, those patients who lack the capacity
to make reasoned decisions, as someone who values strongly individual liberty, I believe Rivers strikes the proper balance be348. See PERuiN, supra note 15, at 346-49.
349. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 492-93, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342-43,
504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986).
350. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.

351. See, e.g., E. GOFEMAN, AsYLUMS 149-52 (1961).
352. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
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tween individual autonomy and the relevant state interests. Those
individuals who value bureaucratic or professional efficiency,
those who wish to conserve at all cost staff resources, will disagree. Beyond amounting to a philosophical reaffirmation of individual liberty, Rivers is more consistent with prior Supreme
Court doctrine than are Project Release and other federal decisions that adopt the professional judgment standard. 35 4 When the

Supreme Court finally addresses the issue, it remains to be seen
whether it carries over Harper from the prison 355 to the civil
hospital context or relies upon the historical underpinning of liberty derived from common law. 35 6 How the Court decides the issue will tell us all how much respect the Court has for the dignity
and individual autonomy of those individuals confined because of
mental illness.

354. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
355. See supra notes 181-206 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
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